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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC

SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 23 NPG STAFF GROUP MEETING

REF: A. NPG (STAFF GROUP)WP(74)8(REVISED), DATED AUGUST 5, 1974

B. STATE 205984

C. NPG (STAFF GROUP)WP(74)10(REVISED), DATED AUGUST 13, 1974

D. USNATO 4964

SUMMARY: AT SEPTEMBER 23 MEETING, NPG STAFF GROUP COMPLETED WORK ON THE DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT ON SHAPE ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY ON AIR DEFENSE USE, WHICH NOW INCLUDES REVISIONS TABLED BY US PER REF B. SG ALSO DISCUSSED THE DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT ON THE NPG STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS AND, AT UK AND CANADIAN REQUEST, AGREED TO CONSIDER A REVISED DRAFT WHICH WOULD HIGHLIGHT POSSIBLE FURTHER AREAS OF STUDY AND WHICH WOULD RECOMMEND KEEPING THE CNI STUDY IN THE NPG FOR THE TIME BEING RATHER THAN FORWARDING IT TO THE DPC. END SUMMARY.

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1. AT SEPTEMBER 23 MEETING, NPG STAFF GROUP (SG) REVIEWED THE DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT ON SHAPE ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY ON AIR DEFENSE USE (REF A). US REP (WOODWORTH) PRESENTED A REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPHS 7 THROUGH 10 OF REF A (NOW NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS 7 THROUGH 12) ALONG

LINES SUGGESTED IN REF B. SG ACCEPTED US REDRAFT WITH MINOR CHANGES. THE AGREED TEXT OF NEW PARAGRAPHS 7 THROUGH 12 IS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW. SG MADE SEVERAL ADDITIONAL EDITORIAL CHANGES TO REMAINDER OF PAPER AND AGREED TO ISSUE IT AS THE DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT FOR APPROVAL BY CAPITALS. MISSION WILL FORWARD THE DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT TO WASHINGTON UPON RECEIPT FROM IS.

2. SG ALSO CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT ON THE NPG STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS (CNI) (REF C). AS FORESHADOWED IN DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT AT SEPTEMBER 12 SG MEETING (REF D, PARA 1), CANADIAN AND UK REPS ARGUED THAT THE CNI STUDY SHOULD BE KEPT IN NPG FOR TIME BEING AND NOT FORWARDED TO DPC, TO ALLOW OPPORTUNITY FOR NPG PERM REPS TO CONSIDER WHETHER FURTHER WORK SHOULD BE DONE ON USE OF WARNING MESSAGES AND ON POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR CARRYING OUT CNI ACTIONS. SG AGREED TO OBTAIN VIEWS OF THEIR CAPITALS ON THIS APPROACH. IS WILL ISSUE SHORTLY

A REDRAFT OF REF C, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CANADIAN AND UK SUGGESTIONS, WHICH MISSION WILL TRANSMIT TO WASHINGTON FOR GUIDANCE.

3. TEXT OF NEW PARAGRAPHS 7 THROUGH 12 OF DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT ON SHAPE ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY ON AIR DEFENSE USE FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RECOMMENDED USE AND OF FAILURE TO GRANT RELEASE

7. THE REQUESTED USE AS WELL AS ITS REFUSAL OBVIOUSLY HAS BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. AS IN ILLUSTRATIVE STUDIES PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY MINISTERS, THE SHAPE STUDY TENDS TO FOCUS ON THE IMPLICATIONS THAT ARE PRIMARILY MILITARY IN CHARACTER. THE STUDY STRESSES THAT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO AUGMENT THE CONVENTIONAL AIR DEFENSE IS NECESSARY TO RESTORE AND MAINTAIN THE AIR SITUATION AND TO PREVENT EXTENSIVE PENETRATION OF DEFENSES WITH SUBSEQUENT SEVERE DAMAGE TO NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCES, NUCLEAR STORAGE SITES AND SUPPLY DEPOTS. IN HIS RELEASE REQUEST SACEUR INDICATES THAT WITHOUT
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THE USE OF NUCLEAR AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS NATO IS MOST LIKELY TO LOSE A MAJOR PORTION OF ACE NUCLEAR STRIKE CAPABILITY AND ATTACK AIR FORCES IN THE CENTRAL REGION. HE ALSO POINTS OUT THAT IF WARSAW PACT AIR SUPERIORITY IS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHED, NATO'S CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES CANNOT RESTORE THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF ACE AND EXTENSIVE WARSAW PACT GROUND PENETRATION OF THE CENTRAL REGION IS MOST LIKELY. AN ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENCE OF NON-USE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT LATER NATO USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD WOULD BE REQUIRED, CREATING A PROBABLE GREATER RISK OF ESCALATION AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE.

8. THE FAILURE OF NATO TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A SITUATION THAT WAS APPARENTLY CRITICAL AND DETERIORATING FOR NATO MIGHT BE INTERPRETED

BY THE ENEMY AS AN INDICATION OF A LACK OF ALLIANCE RESOLVE AND COHESIVENESS. IN HIS REQUEST, SACEUR SUGGESTS THAT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD DEMONSTRATE NATO'S DETERMINATION TO STOP AGGRESSION THROUGH DELIBERATE ESCALATION AND MIGHT DETER THE ENEMY FROM FURTHER AGGRESSIVE ACTS IN THE CENTRAL REGION OR ELSEWHERE.

9. POLITICAL AUTHORITIES WOULD, OF COURSE, BE CONCERNED WITH ESCALATORY RISKS. IN HIS WHISKEY AND ROMEO MESSAGES, SACEUR TAKES THE VIEW THAT THE USE OF AIR DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OVER NATO TERRITORY WOULD ENTAIL A LOW ESCALATORY RISK. SIMILAR OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE IN OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE AND FOLLOW-ON STUDIES PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY MINISTERS. IN ADDITION, THE SHAPE REPORT ON "MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES THAT MIGHT ACCRUE FROM AN EARLY COMBINED USE OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES," STATED THAT LOW YIELD NUCLEAR AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS ARE CONSIDERED BY MOST TO BE AMONG THE LEAST ESCALATORY WEAPONS. WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE RISK OF ESCALATION IS ALSO AFFECTED BY SUCH FACTORS AS HOW THE ENEMY MIGHT PERCEIVE NATO'S ACTIONS AND HOW HE HIMSELF MIGHT BE MOTIVATED TO ESCALATE.

10. POLITICAL AUTHORITIES WOULD ALSO BE CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING POLITICAL CONTROL. A DOMINANT FEATURE OF AIR DEFENSE USE, IN COMMON WITH CERTAIN OTHER MEASURES OF A DEFENSIVE NATURE, E.G. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE, IS THAT THERE ARE NUMEROUS UNPREDICTABLE FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHICH DEPEND ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON ENEMY ACTIONS WHICH ARE BEYOND NATO'S CONTROL. TIME AND LOCATION OF THE PROPOSED USE CANNOT BE DETERMINED WITH ANY DEGREE OF PRECISION IN SECRET

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ADVANCE. THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS THAT MIGHT HAVE TO BE USED CANNOT BE FORECAST WITH ASSURANCE NOR CAN THE RATE OF USE BE PREDICTED WITH ACCURACY. THE TIME DURING WHICH THE ENEMY ATTACK MIGHT CONTINUE IS UNKNOWN. SUCH FACTORS, WHICH TEND TO ARGUE FOR OPEN-ENDED AUTHORIZATION IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE REASONABLE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS, RAISE THE QUESTION OF HOW OVER-ALL POLITICAL CONTROL SHOULD BEST BE MAINTAINED.

11. IN KEEPING WITH THE ABOVE OBSERVATIONS, IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR FROM THE SHAPE STUDY WHAT THE LIMITS TO THE REQUESTED USE MIGHT BE. GEOGRAPHICALLY, THE RELEASE REQUEST APPLIES TO AIR DEFENSE USE IN THE CENTRAL REGION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EXAMPLE MESSAGES SENT BY SACEUR DO NOT MENTION PRECISE NUMBERS OF WEAPONS, WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGE WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE, NOR THE TIME PERIOD OF THE REQUESTED USE. ON THE LATTER POINT, ALTHOUGH THE EXAMPLE MESSAGE SENT BY SACEUR STATES THAT FOLLOW-ON AIR DEFENSE USE MIGHT BE NECESSARY, WHICH IMPLIES THAT THE INITIAL USE REQUEST HAS A FINITE QUALITY, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE TIME LIMIT OF INITIAL USE WOULD BE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT MIGHT BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE RELEASE AUTHORIZATION WOULD BE VALID FROM SOMETIME AFTER 1600 ON 30TH SEPTEMBER TO THE END OF DAYLIGHT ON THE SAME DAY, OR IT MIGHT BE UNDERSTOOD TO CONCERN ONLY THE FIRST ENEMY ATTACK AFTER 1600. WE BELIEVE THAT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES WOULD WANT TO BE AS CLEAR ABOUT SUCH LIMITS AS THE

CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PECULIARITIES OF THE PARTICULAR USE IN QUESTION WOULD ALLOW.

12. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING COMMENTS, MINISTERS MAY WISH TO DISCUSS THE ADEQUACY OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE REQUEST MESSAGE AND CONSIDER ANY OTHER FACTORS THAT, IN THEIR VIEW, MIGHT BEAR ON THE EVALUATION OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL VALUE OF THE PROPOSED USE. THEY MAY ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH THE NECESSARY POLITICAL CONTROL CAN BE MAINTAINED WHILE GIVEING DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBLE NEGATIVE IMPACT THAT THE IMPOSTION OF LIMITS MAY HAVE ON THE EXPECTED MILITARY RESULTS FROM THE PROPOSED USE.

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